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Last Updated on:
July 17, 2010

Publication by Virginia Deane Abernethy

 

Homosexuality in the Cards
Chronicles Magazine [Rockford, Illionois]
March 2004

 

Chronicles, MARCH 2004 / 23

Homosexuality, in the Cards

Hating Ourselves

by Virginia Deane Abernethy

Virginia Deane Abernethy is the author of Population Politics
(reprinted in 1999). Citations for the data from the 1970’s
may be found in her book, Population Pressure and Cultural
Adjustment (1979).

 

 Homosexuality is either genetically or environmentally determined.
Environmental influences are either intrauterineor postnatal.
Behold the universe of possibilities!
Sexual orientation probably results from the interaction of
environment and genetic predisposition, but science, so far,
explains only a little. Voluntarily choosing homosexuality
cannot be discounted, although the more deeply embedded in
genetics or early experience homosexuality is, the less voluntary
it is likely to be.
A related characteristic, sex, is equally mysterious. The sex
ratio at birth, for example, sometimes changes in response to
environmental conditions. Severe drought results in Australian
aborigines who still live in their traditional surroundings
having more girls than boys. Similarly, according to Ralph
Catalano of the University of California, Berkeley, the dissolution
of the communist grip on East Germany (and the ensuing
severe economic dislocation in 1991) was followed by births of
more girls than boys. These findings make it appear that male
embryos are more vulnerable to a harsh intrauterine environment.
If adversity differentially impedes male development,
might it account for some tendency toward male homosexuality?
Very harsh postnatal conditions may also select for homosexuality.
If, for example, rearing children is fraught with
great dif. culties, the presence of nonreproducing adults may
enhance young relatives’ survival and success enough to compensate
the nonmarrying aunts and uncles for forgoing direct
descendants of their own. Concentrating all resources on
fewer children sometimes enhances the reproductive success
of the extended family, thus increasing—in the terminology of
sociobiology—"inclusive . tness."
If homosexuality is not all in the genes, we may speculate
on which current conditions combine to make homosexuality
more visible and probably more prevalent. Among whites,
might low morale and downward mobility account for some 
homosexuality?
Admittedly, schools indoctrinate the young in homosexual
lifestyles, cities and foundations penalize the Boy Scouts of
America for refusal to entrust boys to homosexual troop leaders,
and the military is ambivalent about sexuality. Efforts to
subvert the nation’s young include teaching that white Americans
are guilty of exploiting everyone else and that their vast
achievements are a chimera.
A con. dent people would resist such an attack on their culture
and power. The attack against European-Americans succeeds
because we allow it, giving every sign of being a depressed and
demoralized people. Homosexuality could be addressed if
demoralization were even a fraction of the cause.
Certain demographic pressures undermine con. dence. Working
their way through the economy and political system, demographic
changes have steadily undercut the middle class,
while ethnic diversity is celebrated for its own sake, and traditional
culture is scorned—all leading to a confused state of
mind and country.
Principal changes in U.S. demography stem from the 1965
immigration law, which substituted the principle of "family reuni-
fication" for quotas based on country of origin. In its wake,
not only sheer numbers but the source of immigrants changed.
From approximately 250,000 mostly European newcomers annually,
today’s green-card and work-visa immigrants approach
1.5 million. Illegal immigration adds an additional one-half to
three-quarter million annually. The majority of newcomers
are "minorities."
Both the numbers of nonassimilated newcomers and their
effect on the economy create stress. Rapid growth in the workforce
—if not matched by enough new capital both to create
jobs and to maintain the ratio of capital invested per job—results
in a combination of lower-paid jobs, worse working conditions,
and fewer bene. ts. Harvard professor George Borjas
estimates that, in 2002, immigration depressed the wages of
native workers by 4.9 percent, or about $2,600 per year per
worker. Borjas estimates that each ten-percent increase in immigrant
workers depresses the wage of native-born Americans
by an additional 3.5 percent. Applying Borjas’ methodology to
the latest government statistics, Edwin Rubenstein calculates
that the total annual-income loss from immigration suffered
by native-born workers is $302.9 billion. That loss increases in
lock-step with the size of the immigrant labor force.
The erosion of the average native-born American’s real income
has been accelerating since 1965. A study entitled "Divergent
Paths" (released in 2003 by the Russell Sage Foundation) compares
the wage growth and job security of young white males
entering the labor force in the 1960’s with that of similar men
who began working in the late 1970’s and early 80’s. The study
documents a decline in economic prospects that its authors expect
to be permanent and which has hollowed out the middle
class.
Fierce competition for jobs began to weigh on young Americans
after approximately 1970. For the . rst time in a generation,
entrants into the labor market encountered rapidly growing
numbers from their own ranks—the baby boomers—as
well as women and immigrants. Little by little, job-seekers
began to surpass the net number of new, good jobs. Where a
single income had afforded a rising standard of living for the average
family, two incomes soon became a near necessity. Most
24 / CHRONICLES
women lost the opportunity to choose full-time homemaking.
The burden of supporting a family began to loom large.
Hourly labor endured the earliest effects of saturation in the
labor-market, but professionals in technical . elds where . uent
English is not required have also suffered. Between 1968
and 1995, engineers with ten years’ experience were hit with
a 13-percent decline in wages (measured in constant dollars),
whereupon demographer Michael Teitelbaum declared the
obvious: The problem was too many engineers for too few
jobs.
In 1996, Herbert Stein, former chairman of the president’s
Council of Economic Advisers, observed that "the risk of
becoming unemployed has now spread to people who did
not expect to have that risk." Even when—for the first time
in many years—unemployment dipped below five percent in
1997 and briefly reached four percent in 2000, some observers
suggested that fewer than half of Americans were as financially
secure as they had been some decades earlier.
Phyllis Schlaly attributes much of the increasing unemployment
among American engineers and information-technology
specialists (computer programmers) to special visa programs.
Workers enter the United States under H-1B (limited
in number) and unlimited L-1 visas. The U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics counted 384,191 foreigners who held H-1B visas
and 328,480 with L-1 visas in 2001. These numbers exclude
visitors who have had visas extended for a three-year period or
who work in educational institutions.
At least 890,000 H-1B visa-holders are in the United States at
any time. Visas expire if an H-1B worker loses his job; prosecution
of those who overstay their visa (who become illegal aliens
after the visa expires) is almost nonexistent.
Economic growth must be substantial to overcome the explosion
of the workforce caused by this . ood of immigrants.
During the 1990’s, more than 13 million net new immigrants
arrived in the United States. Andrew Sum and his colleagues
at the Center for Labor Market Studies of Northeastern University
write that "New foreign immigrants contributed nearly
one-half of the growth in the nation’s civilian labor force."
(Labor force is defined as those of working age either employed
or looking for work.)
Recession barely slows immigration. The Center for Immigration
Studies reports that the "number of foreign-born adults
(legal and illegal) holding a job has grown by 1.7 million since
2000, while among natives the number working actually fell
by 800,000." Andrew Sum and his coinvestigators add, "All of
the decline in net employment over the 2000-2002 period was
borne by native-born workers."
American unemployment—reported in September 2003 by
Martin Weiss in the Safe Money Newsletter—is 12.8 percent of
the labor force, if we count underemployed part-timers as well
as the unemployed. The demand for new jobs is immense.
Men face the . ercest job competition, because 70 percent
of working-age immigrants are male. In fact, eight of ten male
workers joining the labor force between 1990 and 2000 were
newly arrived immigrants. Of the two million or so immigrants
arriving annually, approximately three quarters are working
age.
Thus, mass immigration is a major lever on the job market.
Without changes in immigration law and enforcement, it will
rise even as good manufacturing and technical jobs go overseas.
Young Americans and established immigrants will not
enjoy the economic opportunities created by their own country
until immigration stops. When it does, America’s young
men and women will be somewhat buffered from Third World
overpopulation.
Family formation is sensitive to economic conditions. Marriage
requires decision and commitment. Good career paths
make traditional marital relationships attractive and accessible,
while deteriorating circumstances—wealth, income,
security, and prospects for advancement—make people cautious.
Bleak outlooks restrain most people from taking on
responsibilities. Young people without jobs, or with dead-end
jobs below their expectations, often do not marry and try, above
all, to avoid becoming parents.
The young in a generation who have grown accustomed to
lowering expectations and new cultural forms are increasingly
likely to remain economically dependent on their parents.
The 30-year depression in the labor market and debt that grows
in lockstep with our consumer culture discourage both marriage
and the responsibilities of parenthood. Postponed commitments
evolve into singles lifestyles.
A singles lifestyle is the default option in life, "chosen" through
inaction and the passage of time. Meager chances for forming
a traditional family increase the attractiveness of "alternative"
lifestyles. Thus, some young people may try out, or at least become
open to, homosexuality, a variant of the singles culture.
 
If part of the prevalence and visibility of homosexual behavior
is the result of choice, then a possible swing factor is the
perceived ease of supporting a traditional family. Eventually,
the culture bows to multiple fait accomplis and recognizes new
"styles" of relationships.
In fact, declining economic prospects coincided quite remarkably
with the higher visibility—and possibly the prevalence
—of homosexuality. In September 1971, a Minneapolis
judge granted one homosexual the right to adopt another. In
1974, the American Psychiatric Association voted to rescind its
classi. cation of homosexuality as an illness. On the political
front, tax reform in 1973 reduced (and ultimately reversed) the
married-unmarried tax-rate differential that had amounted to a
penalty on the unmarried. Increasingly, homosexuals felt free
from the need to marry.
Antiprocreative lifestyles and choices extended well beyond
overt homosexuality. On March 22, 1972, the U.S. Supreme
Court struck down Massachusetts’ Baird decision, which had restricted
heterosexual couples’ right to contraception. On January
22, 1973, the Court removed legal obstacles to abortion
during the . rst trimester of pregnancy in Roe v. Wade. Women
increasingly asserted their independence from traditional
household and maternal roles. The feminist "revolution" was
so powerful that women who chose not to work outside the
home reported social disapproval, even ostracism. Discussion
of the right to physician-assisted suicide also surfaced in this
era. And, in 1972, California reported that the teenage suicide
rate was the highest in its history.
These antifamily, antilife developments emerged alongside
a dawning sense that overpopulation could become a problem
for America. The . rst Earth Day observance, sponsored in
1972 by Sen. Gaylord Nelson, called for both environmental
protection and stabilization of population size. (Ironically,
population effects are often cyclical. Shrinkage in the workforce
raises wages, so the working people who benefitted generally
increase their likelihood of marrying and reproducing, and
the next generation is larger.)
 
MARCH 2004 / 25
Lasting improvement in economic prospects might raise
morale and bolster appreciation of country and culture—especially
if we recognize that our traditional culture is in a . ght for
survival, a threat compounded by mass immigration and low
birthrates among the native-born. Procreation is often part of a
serious defense. Palestinian women, having few options, fight
for land with the highest fertility rate in any Muslim country.
Those who have opted out of traditional family lifestyles
might be awakened from passivity—even from a sense of futility
and nihilism—if white America were to reject such debilitating
trends as the role assigned to whites by liberal guilt. As
Shelby Steele writes in the Wall Street Journal ("Yo, Howard,"
September 13, 2003), "Racial identity is simply forbidden to
whites in America and across the entire Western world. . . .
[R]acial pride in whites constitutes a grave evil. Say ‘I’m white
and I’m proud’ and you are a Nazi."
Only a black can sing that particular tune, a fact that captures
the depth of white intimidation. Rubbing salt into the
wound, Steele’s piece continues: "No group in recent history
has more aggressively seized power in the name of its racial
superiority than Western whites. This race illustrated for all
time—through colonialism, slavery, white racism, Nazism—
the extraordinary human evil."
If white intimidation were not proved by the appearance of
Steele’s diatribe in the mainstream press, the failure to counter
his attack should do so. A more self-confident press would
object, as does columnist Sam Francis, that Steele’s "nakedly
anti-white claim that whites illustrate for all time an ‘extraordinary
human evil’ is not only flapdoodle . . . but a little gob of
racial spit."
Intimidated European America can rise again—but not easily.
Choosing to defend our ethnic tradition means overcoming
decades of education that elevate victimhood and denigrate
European-American culture and white males—perennially
portrayed as insensitive exploiters. The contrary image—European-
American culture as a noble tradition worth preserving
—could become a beacon for all, including men and women
for whom heterosexual or homosexual preference is closely
balanced.
Restoration of economic prospects to a level where more
children can be satisfactorily and successfully reared could
result in marriage and procreation, which, on one level, are
forms of self-af. rmation. Familial values af. rm cultural values.
We need, therefore, not to renounce a particular sexual orientation
but to af. rm our traditional society, which will drive
our determination to protect American jobs, demand an end
to mass immigration, and turn economic opportunity to the
service of traditional family formation. The return of conditions
that encourage the young to marry and reproduce—and
might facilitate the retreat of optional homosexuality—can
come only through a concerted effort on the part of many
Americans.
Giving way to the forces arrayed against European-American
culture is surrender. Convince men and women to take
pride in their past and future, in their culture and country, and
they will strive for its survival. ¤
 
 
 

©2007 Copyrights, Virginia Deane Abernethy.
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